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but in ten.' 5 The same court has also held that execution on a vendor's lien
may be had at any time within ten years. 6 The court in the principal case
draws an analogy between special benefit judgments and mechanic's lien
judgments in that they can only be liens against the particular property
involved and that they are judgments in rem. The court held unanimously
that since a lien for a judgment for special benefits runs for ten years, the
same limitation should apply to a mechanic's lien judgment.
R. R. N., JR.
PATENTS - DIRECT INFRINGEMIENT - DEFENSES - ATTEMPT OF PATENT
OWNER TO ESTABLISH MONOPOLY OVER UNPATENTED MATERIAL BY MEANS OF
PATENT - [United States]. - Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court)
patented machines for depositing salt tablets, used by the canning industry
for flavoring canned foods. The machines were leased to canners, and the
leases specified that the lessee should use only respondent's unpatented salt
tablets in the leased machines. Respondent sought an injunction and an
accounting for direct infringement of the patent by petitioner, a competitor
in the salt business. Petitioner set up the defense that the condition in
the leases was contrary to public policy and prohibited respondent from
suing for infringement. Held, equity will not enjoin the infringement of a
patent where the holder is using that patent to restrain trade or create a
monopoly over and above that of the patent itself. Morton Salt Co. v.
G. S. Suppiger Co.'
The principal case makes explicit a limitation on the legitimate use of
patents which may be implied from earlier decisions. A patent grants an
exclusive right to make, use and vend the particular device described in
the patent,2 but it does not carry with it the right to a monopoly not within
the grant.3 It is the general rule that courts, particularly courts of equity,
15. Gill, op. cit. supra note 9, at 636, §1421. Boyd v. Ellis (1891) 107
Mo. 394, 18 S. W. 29; Fleckenstien v. Baxter (1893) 114 Mo. 493, 21 S. W.
852; George W. Watson v. The Keystone Iron Works Co. (1904) 70 Kan.
43, 74 Pac. 269; Moore v. Ogden (1880) 35 Ohio St. 430; Byssel v. St. Louis
(1902) 168 Mo. 607, 68 S. W. 893; City of St. Louis v. Annex Realty Co.(1903) 175 Mo. 63, 74 S. W. 961, Schwab v. City of St. Louis (1925) 310
Mo. 116, 274 S. W. 1058; supra note 6, Wayland v. Kansas City (1928)
321 Mo. 654, 12 S. W. (2d) 438.
16. Hockaday v. Lawther (1885) 17 Mo. App. 636.
1. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 402, 86 L. Ed. 317.
2. These rights are sanctioned by the Unitid States Constitution, Art. I,
§8, cl. 8, which reads, "The Congress shall have power * * * (8) To
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writ-
ings and discoveries." They are expressly provided for by statute (35
U. S. C. A. passim).
3. Strictly speaking, a patentee has no right to do anything under the
patent grant, but only the right to exclude others from doing certain things.
However, this is the language ordinarily used. Interstate Circuit v. United
States (1939) 306 U. S. 208; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States (1940)
309 U. S. 436.
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may withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted con-
trary to the public interest.4 A restriction, either by notice5 or contract,6
upon the use of articles with a patented machine after its sale or in a
patented process has been held not within the patent grant and void.7
4. Beasley v. Texas and. Pacific Ry. Co. (1903) 191 U. S. 492, 497;
Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n (1933) 290 U. S.
264, 270, 273; Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. (1933) 289
U. S. 334, 337, 338; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation (1937) 300
U. S. 515, 552; United States v. Morgan (1939) 307 U. S. 183, 194; Securi-
ties & Exchange Comm'n v. United States Realty Co. (1940) 310 U. S.
494, 455.
5. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. (1917) 243
U. S. 502, where plaintiff sold patented movie-projection machines with a
notice specifying the film which could be used in the machine, held, in-
fringement suit would not lie because of the restraining effect of the condi-
tion, and Carbice Corp. v. American Patent Development Corp. (1931) 283
U. S. 27, where respondent was not allowed to maintain suit for the in-
fringement of a patent on a package for the use of solid carbon dioxide as a
refrigerant for ice cream where the use was restricted to Dry Ice.
6. In the case of International Business Machines Corp. v. United States
(1986) 298 U. S. 131, involving the sale of a tabulating machine with a
contractual prohibition against the use of any cards but those put out by
1. B. M., the defense was made that the cards had to be of a certain thick-
ness, durability, etc., but was held unavailing, the court saying that the
company might restrict the kind and quality of cards used, but it could
not specify from whom they were to be bought. See also American Lecithin
Co. v. Warfield Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 207, where plaintiff sold
its patented process for preventing chocolate from "graying," but required
that one essential ingredient, lecithin, an unpatented material, be purchased
from plaintiff. It was held to be an unwarranted use of the patent right. In
Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co. (1938) 302 U. S. 458, which concerned an
attempt to control the sale of an ingredient in road-making by use of a
process-patent for surfacing roads, the court restated the principle that
where a patentee seeks to monopolize an unpatented article he loses his
patent rights. Another case on the same order is United Shoe Machinery
Corp. v. United States (1921) 258 U. S. 451, a case involving the so-
called "tying clause," wherein a manufacturer seeks to compel the use of
one article which is non-exclusive by tying its use to another article which
is essential and monopolized.
7. MacCormack, in an interesting article on this subject in 31 Col. L.
Rev. 743, explains this judicial tendency to restrict the extent of the patent
grant by saying that the rights to use and dispose of the patented article
have always been conceived as separate from all other rights in the article,
and could remain in the patentee when all else was in another. He goes
on to explain (p. 753), "The owner of a patent for a cigar lighter might,
under this theory, walk up Broadway, depositing one of the patented articles
upon each street corner and intending to relinquish ownership to the persons
who would first pick them up; and yet if he made it clear by appropriate
notices that he had no intention to grant any rights of use or sale, the
finders could not lawfully exercise those rights. They might do anything
with the articles except put them to the use for which they were intended,
or sell them. They might destroy them, keep them as ornaments, or give
them away. But if they lighted cigarettes with them or sold them, they
would be infringers of the patent As might be expected, this theory came
into conflict with a strong prejudice against restricting the free use and
alenability of personal property and its implications were never accepted."
(Italics ours.) By extending the theory a step further the court's attitude
toward the present case may be understood.
1942]
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The lease of an unpatented machine upon condition that a certain un-
patented article be used with its has been upheld as not tending to restrain
trade or create a monopoly. 9 The present case, however, involves a patented
machine, leased with a restriction as to its use. The distinction is all-im-
portant because the feature of a patent is its exclusive character. A patent,
almost by definition, carries with it a need, ahd to compel the use of an
unpatented article with the patented article or process would naturally bring
about a limited monopoly.
The principal case is harsh in its effects upon the patentee, for as a
result of it he is unable to bring suit even for direct infringementio and
thus is denied the value of his patent until he ceases the unfair practice,1l
but it is in accord with reason as well as law. Monopolies are frowned upon
in our economic system, and to attach a penalty to their existence seems
just and right.
R. S. S.
TORTS-FALSE IIMIPRISONMENT-INSTRUCTIONS-IMPRISONMENT PRIOR TO
RffrURN OF GOODS WRONGFULLY TAxnS-[Missouri].-Plaintiff's sister-in-
law falsely claimed to be the wife of one A. F. Foster and charged goods
to his account at defendant's department store. The store detective who
knew the real Mrs. Foster became suspicious and detained plaintiff and
her sister-in-law. An investigation was made, in the course of which Mr.
Foster was called on the telephone. He denied any acquaintance with the
women and they were not allowed to talk to him. They were questioned
sharply and duress was used to compel them to admit having made the
purchase upon the credit of an innocent third party. Some packages had
8. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sinclair Ref. Co. (1923) 26 U. S. 463, where
defendant had leased unpatented gasoline pumps upon condition that only
Sinclair gasoline be used in them, the court held that there was no showing
of an unfair trade practice since there was no restraint upon the purchase
and sale of competing gasoline (so long as other pumps were used). The
distinction between this and the principal case is that in the principal case
the lease made a restraint upon the purchase of competing salt tablets
(since other machines could not be obtained).
9. This is in accordance with the contract theory as to contracts which
are not in restraint of trade. See 5 Williston, Contracts (2d ed. 1938)
§1642, p. 4602.
10. Many of the previous cases dealt with contributory infringement,
where the sale of unpatented materials used with a patented machine or
in a patented process was sought to be enjoined, whereas this case deals
with direct infringement by the manufacture of the very thing covered by
the patent.
11. In B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis (1942) 62 S. Ct. 406, 86 L. Ed. 320, a
case similar to the principal one and decided the same day, -the court said,
"* * * petitioner suggests it is entitled to relief because it is now willing to
give unconditional licenses to manufacturers on a royalty basis, which it
offers to do. It will be appropriate to consider petitioner's right to relief
when it is able to show that it has fully abandoned its present method of re-
straining competition in the sale of unpatented articles and that the con-
sequences of that practice have been fully dissipated."
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